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• We elicit social norms in dictator games using Krupka and Weber (2013) procedure.
• We elicit norms separately from dictators, recipients, and third party respondents.
• We find that norms are stable and insensitive to the role of the respondent.
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a b s t r a c t
We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation proce-
dure (Krupka and Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested
third party respondents and find that elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role of the respon-
dent. The results support the use of this procedure as a method for measuring social norms.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
A variety of economic phenomena, from punishing non-co-
operators to tipping in restaurants, have been explained as
norm-driven behavior.1 Recently economists have moved beyond
post-hoc appeals to the explanatory power of social norms, and be-
gun to incorporate the analysis of norms into positive economics
by measuring social norms in experiments. For example, recent
papers have used a norm-elicitation task introduced by Krupka
andWeber (2013, hereafter KW) to study norm-driven behavior in
dictator games (KW), gift-exchange games (Gächter et al., 2013),
oligopoly pricing games (Krupka et al., 2012), and to explain the
behavior of financial advisers and their supervisors towards their
clients (Burks and Krupka, 2012).
∗ Correspondence to: School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University
Park, NG7 2RD, United Kingdom. Tel.: +44 0 1158467492.
E-mail address: daniele.nosenzo@nottingham.ac.uk (D. Nosenzo).
1 See Elster (1989) for a discussion and interpretation of how norms influence
behavior in a variety of settings.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.021
0165-1765/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articIn the KW method for measuring social norms a scenario is
described to subjects who then have to judge each action in the
scenario as ‘‘very socially inappropriate’’, ‘‘somewhat socially in-
appropriate’’, somewhat socially appropriate’’, or ‘‘very socially
appropriate’’. A subject receives a reward if her evaluation agrees
with that of other subjects. Thus, subjects have an incentive to re-
veal what they perceive to be the collectively-shared judgment of
appropriateness of the actions they evaluate, and not their own
personal judgment.2
In principle, the norm-elicitation task could be given to either
interested parties (‘‘stakeholders’’) or, as in most previous appli-
cations, to impartial observers (‘‘spectators’’). For example, norms
about dictator game giving could be elicited from dictators, recip-
ients, or disinterested third parties. Under the assumption that a
2 The material incentives used in the norm-elicitation task generate a coordina-
tion game with multiple equilibria. See KW for a discussion of how coordination
games can be used to elicit social norms in an incentive-compatible way. See also
Xiao and Houser (2005) and Houser and Xiao (2011) who use a related approach to
incentivize evaluators to classify natural languagemessageswith commonly shared
meanings.
le under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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exists, and that subjects use this as a coordination device, any of
these sub-groups are incentivized to reveal the underlying norm. If
measured norms differ across these sub-groups it suggests either
that norms are malleable, or that subjects’ responses are reveal-
ing something other than the social norm. This in turn would raise
questions about the usefulness or validity of KW elicited norms.
One reason norms may be malleable is that stakeholders may
manipulate their responses to justify their actions. For example,
in dictator games a selfish dictator may distort her judgment of
appropriateness to rationalize why she is not giving any money
to the recipient.3 Moreover, stakeholders may use some feature of
their experience in the game as a coordination device. For example,
in dictator games participantsmay give responses that reflectwhat
they did or observed others do in the game. More generally, norms
may vary depending on the identity and role of the respondent.
For instance, norms of distributive justice may vary depending on
one’s relative income.
In this paper we present an experiment examining the KW
norm-elicitation task, focusing on whether measured norms vary
according to the role of respondents. In particular we elicit norms
about dictator game giving and test whether measured norms dif-
fer among stakeholders (dictators and recipients), and spectators
(disinterested third parties).
2. Experimental design
Our experiment is based on the version of the dictator game
used by KW. At the outset of the game the dictator is endowedwith
10 Euros while the recipient is endowed with 0 Euros. The dictator
then decides howmuch of her endowment to give to the recipient,
in increments of 1 Euro. The dictator’s allocation decision deter-
mines the final payoffs for both players.
The focus of our experiment is on the social appropriateness
of the actions available to the dictator in this game. We measure
social appropriateness using the norm-elicitation task proposed
by KW. In this task subjects read a description of the game and
then rate whether each action available to the dictator is ‘‘very so-
cially inappropriate’’, ‘‘somewhat socially inappropriate’’, ‘‘some-
what socially appropriate’’, or ‘‘very socially appropriate’’. At the
end of the experiment subjects are randomly paired with another
participant. One of the dictator’s possible actions is then randomly
selected, and both subjects receive 10 Euros if their appropriate-
ness ratings for the selected action match, and 0 Euros otherwise.
The experiment is based on two treatments. In our Spectators
treatment, as in KW, we collected social appropriateness ratings
from subjects who had not previously participated in the dictator
game they were asked to evaluate. Thus, raters were ‘‘impartial
spectators’’ who had no interest at stake in the game. In contrast,
at the beginning of a session of the Stakeholders treatment subjects
were randomly assigned to the role of either dictator or recipient,
and matched in pairs to play a one-shot version of the dictator
game described above. After recipients had been informed about
the decision of the dictator they were matched with, subjects
rated the appropriateness of the actions available to dictators.4
3 There is some evidence that stakeholders and spectators differ in the extent to
which they punish or reward actions that violate or conform to norms of fairness
(e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Croson and Konow, 2009). A possible reason
for this is that spectators agree and act on norms of fairness to a greater extent
than stakeholders, whose self-interest may confound their normative judgments.
See Konow (2005) for a review of the literature on stakeholders biases in fairness
judgments
4 We informed recipients of the outcome of the game to ensure that
both dictators and recipients entered the norm-elicitation task with the same
information.Subjectswere paid to coordinatewith one other randomly selected
subject who had taken the same role as themselves in the game,
i.e. dictators coordinated with other dictators, and recipients
coordinated with other recipients.
The experimentwas programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007)
andwas conducted atMaastricht University using 114 students re-
cruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). We conducted 2 sessions
of the Spectators treatment (with 38 subjects in total) and 4 ses-
sions of the Stakeholders treatment (with 76 subjects in total). In
the Stakeholders treatment subjects were told that the experiment
consisted of two parts, but were only given instructions about the
norm-elicitation task at the end of the dictator game. Moreover,
subjects were only paid for one task (the dictator game or the KW
norm-elicitation task), randomly selected at the end of the session.
Sessions lasted approximately 40 min and earned 9.81 Euros, in-
cluding a 5 Euros show-up fee.5
3. Results
Fig. 1 shows the mean appropriateness ratings elicited from
subjects in the Spectators and Stakeholders treatments.6In the lat-
ter case, we distinguish between ratings submitted by dictators
and recipients. For comparison, the figure also includes the mean
ratings reported by KW. Tables 1 and 2 show the full distributions
of ratings in our treatments and in KW.
Starting with our Spectators treatment, we note that the rat-
ings elicited in our experiment are remarkably similar to those ob-
served in KW (see Fig. 1 and Table 1). In both experiments, more
than 80% of subjects evaluate the action (10, 0) thatmaximizes the
dictator’s payoff as ‘‘very socially inappropriate’’, and more than
80% evaluate the action (5, 5) that splits wealth equally between
players as ‘‘very socially appropriate’’. In both experiments, actions
leaving dictators with more than 60% of total wealth are viewed as
inappropriate, whereas actions leaving dictators with 60% or less
of total wealth are viewed as appropriate, although in both experi-
ments there is less consensus about the appropriateness of actions
that leave recipients with more than half of total wealth.
To detect any systematic differences between our data and KW
data, we conduct Fisher’s randomization tests comparing, for each
action, the ratings elicited in our experiment and in KW.7 Ten of
11 comparisons are statistically insignificant at the 10% level. The
exception occurs for the action (6, 4), which our raters evaluated as
somewhatmore appropriate thanKW’s raters. However, this result
should be interpretedwith caution given the inflation of the overall
type I error rate due to multiple testing. None of the comparisons
are statistically significant if we use a Bonferroni correction to ac-
count for multiple testing, and so overall our Spectators treatment
successfully replicates the KW norm-elicitation experiment.
Table 2 reports the distribution of responses of subjects in the
Stakeholders treatment. There are very few differences between
the ratings submitted by dictators and recipients, and these ratings
are in fact very similar to those collected in the Spectators treat-
ment. As in KWand in our Spectators treatment, both dictators and
recipients generally agree that the action (10, 0) is least appropri-
ate and the action (5, 5) is most appropriate. Moreover, for each
action, the modal response by either dictators or recipients coin-
cides with that in the Spectators treatment.
5 See our supplementary materials (Appendix A) for further details of the
experimental procedures.
6 Mean ratings were constructed by converting responses into numerical scores
using the same scale used by KW: ‘‘very socially inappropriate’’= −1, ‘‘somewhat
socially inappropriate’’ = −1/3, ‘‘somewhat socially appropriate’’ = 1/3, ‘‘very
socially appropriate’’= 1.
7 See Moir (1998) for a discussion of the randomization test.
30 H. Erkut et al. / Economics Letters 130 (2015) 28–31Fig. 1. Mean appropriateness ratings across treatments. Note: the horizontal axis displays the final wealth allocation corresponding to each of the 11 actions available to
dictators in the dictator game.Table 1
Appropriateness ratings: KW and Spectators treatment.
Action KW raters Spectators
Mean −− − + ++ Mean −− − + ++
(10, 0) −0.80 82% 10% 3% 5% −0.81 84% 8% 3% 5%
(9, 1) −0.64 61% 31% 3% 6% −0.58 53% 34% 11% 3%
(8, 2) −0.44 35% 51% 10% 4% −0.44 32% 53% 16% 0%
(7, 3) −0.16 8% 62% 26% 4% −0.07 3% 55% 42% 0%
(6, 4) 0.14 3% 30% 61% 7% 0.28 0% 18% 71% 11%
(5, 5) 0.87 0% 3% 14% 83% 0.82 3% 3% 13% 82%
(4, 6) 0.57 0% 7% 50% 43% 0.68 0% 11% 26% 63%
(3, 7) 0.42 1% 22% 39% 37% 0.58 3% 18% 18% 61%
(2, 8) 0.32 6% 31% 23% 40% 0.40 11% 21% 16% 53%
(1, 9) 0.22 17% 24% 19% 40% 0.32 18% 21% 5% 55%
(0, 10) 0.18 26% 13% 18% 43% 0.21 32% 11% 3% 55%
Note: responses are ‘‘very socially inappropriate’’ (−−), ‘‘somewhat socially inappropriate’’ (−), ‘‘somewhat socially appropriate’’ (+), ‘‘very socially appropriate’’ (++).
Modal responses are shaded.Table 2
Appropriateness ratings: Stakeholders treatment.
Action Stakeholders — Dictators Stakeholders — Recipients
Mean −− − + ++ Mean −− − + ++
(10, 0) −0.86 89% 3% 5% 3% −0.84 84% 11% 3% 3%
(9, 1) −0.68 61% 32% 8% 0% −0.53 47% 37% 13% 3%
(8, 2) −0.39 26% 55% 18% 0% −0.35 24% 61% 11% 5%
(7, 3) −0.05 0% 58% 42% 0% −0.12 11% 53% 32% 5%
(6, 4) 0.28 0% 24% 61% 16% 0.30 0% 18% 68% 13%
(5, 5) 0.84 0% 3% 18% 79% 0.84 0% 3% 18% 79%
(4, 6) 0.72 0% 3% 37% 61% 0.65 3% 5% 34% 58%
(3, 7) 0.58 0% 11% 42% 47% 0.51 5% 18% 21% 55%
(2, 8) 0.44 3% 26% 24% 47% 0.49 8% 21% 11% 61%
(1, 9) 0.30 18% 21% 8% 53% 0.44 16% 16% 5% 63%
(0, 10) 0.21 32% 8% 8% 53% 0.39 24% 8% 5% 63%
Note: responses are ‘‘very socially inappropriate’’ (−−), ‘‘somewhat socially inappropriate’’ (−), ‘‘somewhat socially appropriate’’ (+), ‘‘very socially appropriate’’ (++).
Modal responses are shaded.
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the Spectators treatment with those elicited from either dictators
or recipients in the Stakeholders treatment. None of the compar-
isons is statistically significant at the 10% level. Moreover, we do
not find any significant difference between ratings submitted by
dictators and recipients. These results suggest that the KW norm-
elicitation procedure is robust to potential stakeholder biases.8
4. Conclusion
We find that norms of dictator game giving elicited from dic-
tators and recipients are similar to those elicited from disinter-
ested third parties. These results suggest that norms elicited using
the KWprocedure are not malleable to judgment biases associated
with the role of the respondents, nor are they affected by respon-
dents’ previous experiencewith the decision setting they are asked
to evaluate. This supports the use of the KW norm-elicitation pro-
cedure as a method for measuring social norms.
Our results stand in contrast with the findings reported in a re-
cent study by Rustichini and Villeval (2014). In their experiment
subjects report personal judgments about the fairness of actions
available to players in dictator, ultimatum and trust games, both
before and after playing the games. They find evidence of ‘‘moral
hypocrisy’’ in the sense that individuals whose actions violate their
initial fairness judgments manipulate their later judgments to rec-
oncile these judgments with their actual decisions. These findings
point to the vulnerability of personal judgments of fairness to self-
serving distortions and manipulations.
While these findings may appear to contradict our results,
we note that a crucial difference between Rustichini and Villeval
(2014) and us lies in the nature of the elicited norms. Rustichini
andVilleval (2014) ask subjects to report their own personalnorms,
i.e. non-incentivized judgments aboutwhat they consider to be ap-
propriate actions in a given decision setting. In contrast, the KW
task aims at eliciting subjects’ perception of the underlying social
norm, i.e. judgments about what they perceive others may con-
sider to be appropriate. Indeed, Burks and Krupka (2012) find sys-
tematic differences between social norms elicited using the KW
task and non-incentivized personal norms. Taken together these
results highlight the importance of distinguishing between per-
sonal norms, i.e. private rules or obligations that may be subject
to self-serving biases and moral hypocrisy, and social norms as
8 The results are robust to comparing medians rather than means. Median tests
indicate forty-two of 44 comparisons are statistically insignificant at the 10% level.
The two exceptions are between our spectators and KW for the actions (4, 6) and
(3, 7). None of the comparisons are significant if we use a Bonferroni correction.collectively-shared understandings of what constitutes socially ac-
ceptable behavior.
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